IMMUNITY OF CHARITABLE INSTITUTIONS TO
TORT LIABILITY: AN ERODING DEFENSE

THE DOCTRINE WHICH EXEMPTs charitable institutions from tort liability1 met with new rebuff in the recent case of Noel v. Menninger
Foundation2 There, the plaintiff, seeking damages for allegedly negligently caused injury, had been stymied in the trial court by a demurrer
which had been sustained on the ground that the defendant, as a charitable institution, was immune from such suits. The Kansas Supreme
Court, however, overruling a long line of precedent,3 , reversed, holding
that the policy reasons justifying this immunity no longer obtained and,
further, that it contravened the Kansas Bill of Rights.
The history of this doctrine of immunity is a checkered one. First
enunciated in England in 1846,' it was shortly thereafter repudiated,6
only to be adopted in Massachusetts in 1876,' whence it spread rapidly
throughout this country." Its growth was nurtured by feelings of judicial solicitude for financially weak but vitally needed charitable organizations whose operations, it was feared, might otherwise be seriously impeded. Valid though this concern may then have been, however, it would appear to be less compelling today when many charitable
institutions have grown into enormous businesses, owning vast amounts
of property,' much of it tax free, and when liability insurance has
'See generally PROSSER, TORTS, § io8 (i4i); Appleman, Tort Liability of Charitable Institutions, 22 A.B.A.J. 4.8 (i936) ; Scott, Tort Liability of Hospitals, 17 TENN.
L. REv'. 838 (1943); Note, 30 N.C.L. REv. 67 (1951).
2 175 Kan. 751, 267 P.2d 934 (i954).

'Nicholson v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Hospital Ass'n, 97 Kan. 480, 155
Pac. 920 (1916) ; Davin v. Kansas Medical, Missionary and Benevolent Ass'n, 103 Kan.
48, 172 Pac. ioo2 (i918) ; Webb v. Vought, 127 Kan. 799, 275 Pac. 170 (1929) ; Ratlifte v. Wesley Hospital, 135 Kan. 3o6, 1o P.2d 859 (1932); Leeper v. Salvation
Army, z58 Kan. 396, 147 P.2d 702 (1944).
' "All persons, for injuries suffered in person, . . . shall have remedy by due
course of law.., without delay." KANSAS BILL OF RIoHTS § 18.
'Feoffees of Heriot's Hospital v. Ross, 12 Cl. & F. 507, 8 Eng. Rep. i5o8 (H.L.
1846).
'Mersey Docks Trustees v. Gibbs, it H.L. Cas. 686, ix Eng. Rep. 15oo (x866).
7 McDonald v. Massachusetts General Hospital, 12o Mass. 432 (1876).
' See Note, 25 A.L.R.2d 29, 142 et seq. (1952).
0 See, e.g., Noel v. Menninger Foundation, 175 Kan. 751, 267 P.2d 934, 939
(1954).
10 See, e.g., Silvia v. Providence Hospital, 14. Cal.2d 762, 97 P.2d 798 (939)
wherein there are detailed the assets of defendant hospital which was only one of
several charitable institutions run by a central organization.
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become so readily procurable. Nevertheless, the doctrine of immunity
has, to a large extent, lingered on. 1
Apart from policy, various legal theories have been adduced in support of this doctrine. It has been urged, for example, that the concept
of respondeat superior should not render a charitable institution liable
for the torts of its employees since it derives no profit from their services. " This would seem to be quite irrelevant, however, as the availability of respondeat superior as the basis of an employer's tort liability
has traditionally depended on other factors. 3 A "trust fund" theory has
also been invented, under which it has been argued that the diversion of
funds held in trust by a charitable institution to the payment of a judgment for negligence would thwart the donor's intent where no provision
for such payment appears in the indenture. 4 It should be noted, however, that the relationship of a corporation, whether charitable or not,
to its property is not precisely that of a legal trustee to his trust funds; 1 '
and even in this latter relationship, the trust fund has no ultimate immunity from a tort judgment, but a mere technical immunity because
of the legal estate of the trustee therein.' Similarly specious are the
assertions that a person who avails himself of charitable services constructively waives his right of action for, and assumes the risk of,
negligence;' 7 or that charitable institutions, because of their intimate
association with the state in performing public welfare functions, share
the immunity of the state and its agencies.' 8 These fictions do not accord with common experience and beliefs, and have not widely been
" See, e.g., note z2 and accompanying text infra.

12 E.g., Hearns v. Waterbury Hospital, 66 Conn. 98, 33 At. 595 (1895) , Farrigan
v. Pevear,

Mass. 147, 78 N.E. 855 (29o6).
OF THE LAW OF AGENCY §§ 349-63
The author points out that respondeat superior has been justified on
the principal has the power of control over the agent as well as on
the principal derives profit from the acts of the agent; moreover, he
293

13See MECHEM, OUTLINES

(4 th ed. 1952).
the ground that
the ground that
suggests that the

inevitability of harm arising from doing business with agents is the most important
factor giving vitality to the doctrine. See also Ray v. Tucson Medical Center, 72
Ariz. 22, 230 P.2d 22o (2952); Session v. Thomas D. Dee Memorial Hospital Ass'n,
94 Utah 460, 78 P.zd 645 (2938).
"E.g., Parks v. Northwestern University, 2z8 Il. 381, 75 N.E. 99z (1905);
Cook v. John N. Norton Memorial Infirmary, 1So Ky. 331, 202 S.W. 874 (298).
223 ScoTr, TRUSTS § 348.x (939).
162 id., §§ 264, 271A (1939).

'7E.g., Wilcox v. Idaho Falls Latter Day Saints Hospital, 59 Idaho 35o, 82 P.2d
849 (938);

874

Cook v. John N. Norton Memorial Infirmary, x8o Ky. 332,

202

S.W.

(2918).

"E.g., Fordyce v. Woman's Christian National Library Ass'n, 79 Ark. 550, 96
S.W. 255 (x9o6); University of Louisville v. Hammock, 127 Ky. 564, xo6 S.W.
219 (1907).
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courts.' 9

entertained by the
Finally, it has been observed that a policy
so firmly entrenched should be altered only by legislative action.2" But
there would appear to be no sound reason in law or logic why a doctrine
originally promulgated by the courts2 ' should not, with equal validity,
be cast aside by them in favor of a more salutary public policy.
The theories upon which the doctrine has been rested are thus as
intellectually unsatisfying as the results of its application. And although
22
the doctrine is still embraced uncritically in a number of jurisdictions,
dissatisfaction with its operation is reflected in the modifications of its
application in many jurisdictions.
By way of modification, some states have permitted charitable institutions but a limited immunity by excluding non-trust property from
the execution of a tort judgment.2 3 And frequently immunity has been
made to depend on the status of the plaintiff-it being held not to extend to torts committed against a servant 24 or a stranger, ix., one not
a recipient of benefit from the institutionY 5 Further, a few courts, al"'E.g., Ray v. Tucson Medical Center, 72 Ariz. 22, 230 P.zd 220 (1951) (rejecting the doctrine of implied waiver and assumption of risk; Lichty v. Carbon County
Agr. Ass'n, 31 F. Supp. 809 (M.D. Pa. 1940) rejecting the doctrine of immunity because of close association with the state). See also Note, 25 A.IL.R.zd 29, 67-68 (-95-).
'0 E.g., Foley v. Wesson Memorial Hospital, 246 Mass. 363, 141 N.E. 113 (1923)
DeGroot v. Edison Institute, 306 Mich. 339, 1o N.W.zd 907 (1943).
21 See notes 5-8 and accompanying text supra.
22 Ten jurisdictions accord charitable institutions complete
immunity from tort
liability. Michael v. St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co., 9z F. Supp. 14o (W.D.
Ark. 195o ) 5 Williams' Adm'x v. Church Home for Females, 223 Ky. 355, 3 S.W.zd
753 (x978)5 Jensen v. Maine Eye and Ear Infirmary, 107 Me. 408, 78 At. 898
(igo) 5 Howard v. South Baltimore General Hospital, 19r Md. 617, 62 A.±d 574
(948) ; Bearse v. New England Deaconess Hospital, 321 Mass. 750, 7z N.E.2d 743
(1947); Dille v. St. Luke's Hospital, 355 Mo. 436, 196 S.W.Zd 61S (1946); Gregory v. Salem General Hospital, 175 Ore. 464, 153 P.2d 837 (1944)5 Bond v. Pittsburgh, 368 Pa. 404, 84 A.±d 328 (295i) ; Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc., xi8 F. Supp. 868 (W.D.S.C. 1954)5 Schau v. Morgan, 41 Wis. 334,

6 N.W.zd 212 (194±).
"Moore v. Moyle, 405 Ill. 555, 9z N.E.2d 81 (195o)5 McLeod v. St. Thomas
Hospital, 17o Tenn. 423, 95 S.W.2d 917 (1936) St. Luke's Hospital Ass'n v. Long,
125 Colo. 25, 24o P.2d 917 (1952); Robertson v. Executive Committee of Baptist
Convention, 55 Ga.App. 469, 19o S.E. 432 (-937).
z
2' Hordern v. Salvation Army, 199 N.Y. 233, 9 N.E. 626 (92o);
Cowano
v. North Carolina Baptist Hospitals, 297 N.C. 41, 147 S.E. 672 (29z9); Gable v.
Salvation Army, x86 Okla. 687, oo P.±d 244 (294o); Medical and Surgical Memorial Hospital v. Cauthorn, z29 S.W.zd 93z (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
2' Alabama Baptist Hospital Board v. Carter, z26 Ala. 109, 145 SO. 443 (-93-) 5
Cohen v. General Hospital Soc., 123 Conn. 188, 54 Atl. 435 (1931 ) ; Winona Technical Institute v. Stolte, 173 Ind. 39, 89 N.E. 393 (19o9); Jewell v. St. Peter's
Parish, io N.J. Super. 2±9, 76 A.2d 927 (195o) 5 Walker v. Memorial Hospital,
187 Va. 5, 45 S.E.2d 898 (1948). On the other hand, most of these jurisdictions

DUKE BAR JOURNAL

[Vol. 5: 5z

though denying recovery against a charitable institution in tort, will
allow it on a breach of contract theory, 26 or permit negligent service to
be set up as a defense to an action for the value of the services rendered." Other courts have granted recovery when the tort is committed
in the course of non-charitable or commercial activities even though the
activities are carried on to obtain revenue to be used for charitable purposes. 28 Two states, moreover, have passed statutes which give a negligently injured party a direct action against the institution's insurance
company and prohibit the company from raising the defense of charitable immunity. 29 Another ameliorative technique employed by some
courts has been to distinguish between corporate negligence-neglect
on the part of officers and managers-and negligence on the part of subordinate employees, allowing recovery for the former.30
The Noel case and other recent decisions,' on the other hand, suggest a trend beyond mere amelioration towards complete rejection of
the immunity doctrine. And where the courts have been unfettered by
contrary precedent, this proclivity has been even more marked. 2 This
would seem to reflect the growing recognition of the obsolescence of the
have conferred immunity with respect to torts committed against a beneficiary, and
where a hospital is the tort-feaser the mere fact that the injured patient paid in whole
or in part for his services will not necessarily remove him from the status of beneficiary.
See, e.g., Powers v. Massachusetts Homeopathic Hospital, xo9 Fed. 294 (st Cir.
go1), cert. denied, 183 U.S. 695 (go).

But cf. Nicholson v. Good Samaritan Hospi-

tal, 145 Fla. 36o, 199 So. 344 (1940) where the court distinguished between paying
and non-paying patients and allowed recovery to former.
0
" E.g., Tucker v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 191 Ala. 57z, 68 So. 4 (1g1S); Parrish
v. Clark, 107 Fla. 598, 145 So. 848 (1933).
'Beverly Hospital v. Early, 292 Mass. 2ox, 197 N.E. 641 (935).
28McKay v. Morgan Memorial Co-op. Industries and Stores, Inc., .72 Mass.
12s, 172 N.E. 68 (1930)
(operated a series of stores), School Dist. v. Philadelphia,
367 Pa. x8o, 79 A.ad 433 (x95i) (engaged in mining); Pearlstein v. A. M.
McGregor Home, 79 Ohio App. 526, 73 N.E.ad io6 (1947) (operated apartment
house); Rhodes v. Millsaps College, 179 Miss. 596, 176 So. 253 (1937) (rented part
of a building as office space).
0
ARK. STAT. § 66-517 (947); MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 82 (z947).
20 Evans v. Lawrence and Memorial Associated Hospitals, 133 Conn. 311, 50
A.ad 443 (x946) ; Medical and Surgical Memorial Hospital v. Cauthorn, 229 S.W.2d
932 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
31 Ray v. Tucson Medical Center, 72 Ariz. 22, 230 P.ad 220 (1951); Haynes
v. Presbyterian Hospital Ass'n, 241 Iowa 1269, 45 N.W.ad 1sz (1950); St. Paul
Mercury Indemnity Co. v. St. Joseph's Hospital, 212 Minn. 558, 4 N.W.ad 637
(942) ; Rickbeil v. Grafton Deaconess Hospital, 74 N.D. 525, 23 N.W.ad 247 (1946)
Brigham Young University v. Lillywhite, zi8 F.ad 836 (xoth Cir. 1941).
32Durney v. St. Frances Hospital, 83 A.ad 753 (Del. Super. 195); Foster v.
Roman Catholic Diocese, 116 Vt. 124, 7o A.ad 230 (195o); Malloy v. Fong, 37
Cal.ad 356, 232 P.2d 241 (195Y)i President and Directors of Georgetown College
v. Hughes, 13o F.ad 8zo, (D.C. Cir. 1942).
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doctrine and its adverse social consequences, and echo the sentiments of
Justice Rutledge who, after reviewing the history of the doctrine, remarked that even though it may have been validly conceived, the doctrine of immunity "should33 go and the object of the charity be placed
on a par with all others.1
JOHN A. REED
"President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 13o F.2d 810,
(D.C. Cir. 3942).
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